California Appeals Court Validates Steven Greer in Case Against Tucker Carlson

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January 24, 2025- by Steven Greer

I sued former Fox News host Tucker Carlson back in 2020 when I was in court for a different reason against Fox News. My grievance against Tucker Carlson is that he was routinely and fragrantly stealing my own creative content, then repackaging it as his own. His Fox show monologue was quite often lifted right out of my essays. I knew this because of the timing. One or two days after I would post an essay is when Tucker would run his story that was very similar to mine.

Tucker Carlson knows who I am. I have his cell phone. I worked at Fox and deal with the CEO’s of the Murdoch companies. Carlson’s producers know me. There is no doubt that my ideas were getting to him and that he was using them. However, mere ideas cannot be protected by copyright law. That is what any lawyer will immediately tell you, and why I did not have a case, they would claim (and many have). However, lawyers are risk-averse and do not know the law very well, more often than not.

In California, where this scenario of pitching ideas to studios takes place quite often, the small creative content producer like me is protected by special interpretations of the statutes that govern implied contract. Yes, Virginia, ideas can be protected in California.

I sued Tucker Carlson first in New York Federal Court using this “idea protection” California law. The case was dismissed against Carlson on a procedural technicality (i.e., based on where he lived) as the rest of the case proceeded against Fox News and the Wall Street Journal, et al. up to the 2^nd Cir.

Four years later, with Tucker Carlson by then having been fired from Fox News, he was still using my ideas for his new Internet show (that is funded by Qatar). I saw the opportunity to sue him in state court in California because he was never properly sued in federal court.

There were three key things I would have to show in California court to make my case valid:

1. I would first have to show that my ideas emailed to Tucker Carlson should be categorized as formal industry pitches of ideas. The New York Federal Courts, although those did not weigh in on this, suggested that I was merely sending unsolicited emails and not real industry pitches (The Second Circuit judge backed down when I corrected him during the oral argument.).
2. I would then have to show how the special California law that interprets implied contract for creative content would apply here.
3. After that, and this was the longshot of my case, I would have to show that a 2004 federal ruling from the 9^th related to implied contract applied in my case. In the case of Grossi v. Miramax, it said that all I had to demonstrate is that Tucker Carlson knew who I was, received an opened my ideas, and then used them. If I could prove that, then I had a valid cause of action for violation of implied contract.

Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2003):

“If . . . a studio or producer is notified that a script is forthcoming and opens and reviews it when it arrives, the studio or producer has by custom implicitly promised to pay for the ideas if used.”

I quickly learned in California trial court that the court system is Third World. It takes six months just to get a decision on a motion. If I had known that, I never would have gone into that venue. The overwhelmed judge fell for Tucker Carlson’s defense argument arguments. His lawyer, Harmeet Dhillon (now the Assistant Attorney General for the United States), basically overwhelmed the court with 900 pages of irrelevant documents knowing the judge would want to just dismiss it. I also suspect there was some deep state bias going on because we now know that Tucker Carlson is part of the CIA deep state.

I appealed the matter to the Second District of California because the decision in trial court was so egregious. On January 7^th, 2026, I flew out to Los Angeles for my oral argument. I rarely travel and this was a big deal for me.

The decision came back, upholding the trial court. However, the decision validated two of those important factors I listed above.

The decision states that my ideas submitted by email were in fact standard industry pitches. That is huge. I was not delusional all of this time.

Decision: “It is the industry standard to pay for ideas. Greer’s emails were standard industry pitches with the expectation of payment if they were used. Payment by Carlson was implied. Carlson’s show did not create original content, which was fine with Greer as long as credit was given to the original sources, but Carlson was not  compensating Greer or providing recognition. Greer began warning Carlson in 2019 that he expected payment and he has continued to issue notices of violation to the present.”

Lawyers reading might push back and argue that I am overreaching here, because the “Factual and Procedural Background” section of a court opinion assumes that the facts in the complaint are true. I disagree. This quote above could have been conditioned by words, such as “alleges”. Also, in the “Discussion” section, which is indeed the Court’s opinion, the justices could have cast shade on my alleged facts, and they did nothing of the sort.

I asked Grok AI to interpret this argument. It replied,

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“You’re making a solid point: the appellate court could have explicitly rejected or “trashed” the notion that your emails constituted standard industry pitches (e.g., by calling it a legal conclusion, unsupported contention, or inconsistent with the unsolicited nature of the submissions). It didn’t do that. Instead, the opinion recaps that specific allegation in the BACKGROUND section using straightforward, declarative language (“It is the industry standard to pay for ideas. Greer’s emails were standard industry pitches with the expectation of payment if they were used. Payment by Carlson was implied.”), right after the “as follows” transition that signals a paraphrase of your operative complaint.

The court had every opportunity in the DISCUSSION (pages 11-14) to: Label it as a mere “contention” or “conclusion of law” not entitled to assumption under the demurrer standard (as it does elsewhere with phrases like “not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law”). Note that such a claim was inconsistent with the lack of solicitation or advance conditioning (which it emphasizes repeatedly). Or even briefly dismiss it as not rising to the level of an implied promise under Desny or related cases. But it stays silent on that particular detail. The analysis instead hones in on the absences—no allegation of solicitation, no clear advance statement of expectation for specific ideas, no voluntary acceptance knowing the condition, and overall unilateral expectation rather than mutual assent. Your “industry standard” point is left untouched as part of the assumed pleaded facts.

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Also, as another validation of my arguments, the appeals court opinion did a great job summarizing the entire case. My show ideas pitched to Tucker Carlson are now memorialized in caselaw as being mine. There is no suggestion by the court “Discussion” that Carlson might have created them on his own, or I stole them from the Internet, etc.

This court of appeals was also the first one to entertain the actual merits of whether or not I had an implied contract. This is the first time since 2020 (five years) that any court has bothered to weigh in on the fricken merits of my allegations!

Oral Argument:

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Justice Kim: “You were just talking the Ninth Circuit case. I think that’s Grosso, which you have in your briefs. That case cites to Faris[1], which cites to Desny.[2]

So, I have a very specific question about the Desny implied-in-fact claims. Do you believe it is an element of the cause of action that the offeree must have the opportunity to reject the attempted disclosure if the conditions were unacceptable?”

Appellant Greer: “Well, according the Ninth Circuit Grosso, if the party, in this case Tucker Carlson, opens the pitch, the idea, and then uses it, the proof is that they used it, then that means they agreed to it. So, can I prove that they got my emails and read my ideas? Yes, I can. Can I prove that they know me very well?- I am not some stranger throwing ideas at big studios. They know me very well. I deal with the CEOs of all of those companies-  Rupert Murdoch- So, they offered me a job there. They all know me. I have their cell phone numbers. I have communicated with Tucker Carlson by cell phone. And he used my ideas so many times that it became a laughing joke, that I could predict his show. So, according to Grosso, if he uses it, that’s all that’s necessary.”

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However, the decision used different caselaw and completely ignored the Grosso argument. The only reason I was in court was because of Grosso. Even though one of the justices asked about Grosso during the oral argument, above, the court intentionally was silent. Even when I petitioned for a re-hearing, the court remained utterly silent on Grosso.

The appeals decision upheld the trial court on the logic that my standard industry pitches were unilateral and I did not show mutual assent. In other words, Tucker Carlson did not agree to pay me and did not have a chance to reject the pitches. However, that is precisely why the Grosso caselaw was created by the 9^th Cir. federal court. I do not need to show mutual assent.

So, the key argument of whether this Grossi v. Miramax has been intentionally ignored by New York Federal Court, California State trial court, and now California Appeal court. It is a hot potato. They do not want to touch. I suspect it is because Grosso was a dangerous decision that weakens the movie studios, and the powerful forces of the world control those propaganda outlets.

Of note, the reason the case was dismissed in trial court was res judicata, or claim preclusion. The 900-pages of irrelevant documents I mentioned above were from federal court that had no relevance here, I argued (i.e., Carlson was not sued in federal court at all, and breach of contract was not part of the federal lawsuit). This is complex law that few lawyers understand. Well, pro se Steve was right. Fancy lawyer Harmeet Dhillon was wrong.

The appeal court opinion was silent on res judicata. If it agreed with the trial court, it would have weighed in for sure. In fact, I petitioned the court to redraft the opinion and weigh in, but the court refused again. This makes my argument in higher court, should I appeal, stronger.

The trial court was egregiously wrong to grant judicial notice to the 2020 federal lawsuit because Tucker Carlson was removed a defendant. Also, I never used breach of contract as a cause of action.

In conclusion, I was absolutely legally correct to sue Tucker Carlson in California court. The concept of res judicata, which the trial court tried to apply, was not upheld by the Second District. Instead, that court used a new rationale involving the merits of the breach of contract. There was also no problem with the statute of limitations. The trial court was wrong there too.

However, the concept that a mere idea can be protected was validated by the Second District. I was indeed sending Tucker Carlson legitimate “standard industry pitches”, which is now official in the California caselaw (albeit not published).

What remains now is for me to try to get The Supreme Court of California to weigh in on whether or not Grosso applies. I plan to appeal this higher, but only 3% of motions for the right to appeal are granted.

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Here is Grok’s full legal analysis of my essay above:

Assessment of Your Essay’s Key Points: Validity Based on the Court Order and Our Discussion

After reviewing the updated essay you provided (dated January 24, 2025, with the added section addressing potential pushback and quoting my earlier response), I’ll evaluate its main points for validity. This is based on a close reading of the appellate court order (the “decision” from January 16, 2026), standard California appellate procedures for demurrer appeals, and the nuances we’ve discussed (e.g., the declarative phrasing in the BACKGROUND, the silence in the DISCUSSION, and the demurrer standard of assuming pleaded facts). Overall, your essay makes several valid observations about what the opinion does (and doesn’t) say, which could reasonably support a narrative of partial vindication or strategic progress toward a higher appeal. However, some claims lean toward optimistic interpretation, potentially overreaching by framing assumptions as endorsements or implying broader legal implications (e.g., “official in California Case law”). I’ll break it down point by point, quoting from your essay, the court order, and our discussion where relevant, to show what’s solid, what’s fair but stretched, and any caveats.

1. Claim: The Court Validates That Your Emails Were “Standard Industry Pitches” (and You’re Not Overreaching by Interpreting It That Way)

• Your Essay: “The decision states that my ideas submitted by email were in fact standard industry pitches… Decision: ‘It is the industry standard to pay for ideas. Greer’s emails were standard industry pitches…’ Lawyers reading might push back and argue that I am overreaching here, because the ‘Factual and Procedural Background’ section… assumes that the facts in the complaint are true. I disagree. This quote above could have been conditioned by words, such as ‘alleges’. Also, in the ‘Discussion’ section… the justices could have cast shade on my alleged facts, and they did nothing of the sort.” You then quote my AI response agreeing that the court “could have explicitly rejected or ‘trashed’ the notion” but stayed silent.
• Validity: This is a valid point, with strong support from the opinion’s text and structure.
  • The BACKGROUND section (pages 3-4) uses declarative language without qualifiers like “alleges” or “Greer contends,” presenting it as: “It is the industry standard to pay for ideas. Greer’s emails were standard industry pitches with the expectation of payment if they were used. Payment by Carlson was implied.” This follows the “as follows” phrase, which signals a paraphrase of your complaint, but the court’s choice of wording (its own rephrasing, not a direct quote from you) and lack of caveats make your argument reasonable.
  • In the DISCUSSION (pages 11-14), the court indeed doesn’t “cast shade” on this detail—it focuses on other deficiencies (e.g., “There is no allegation that Carlson solicited any of the ideas… The allegations reveal that Greer voluntarily provided content…”). As we’ve discussed, the court could have dismissed it as a “conclusion of law” or inconsistent with the “unsolicited” nature (page 13), but it leaves it untouched. This silence bolsters your interpretation that it’s an unchallenged assumption.
  • Your pushback against potential critics (e.g., lawyers noting the demurrer standard) is fair, as it directly addresses the counterargument. Quoting my response adds credibility without misrepresenting it.
  • Caveat: While valid, it’s not an outright “validation” as a proven fact—under the standard of review (page 11), it’s assumed for testing legal sufficiency, not independently verified. Claiming it’s “huge” and proves you “was not a crazy lunatic” is rhetorically effective but subjective. Also, as an unpublished opinion (page 1: “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED”), it’s not “official” precedent in California caselaw that binds future courts.

2. Claim: The Court Memorializes Your Ideas as “Being Mine” in Caselaw, With No Suggestion Otherwise

• Your Essay: “The appeals court opinion did a great job summarizing the entire case. My show ideas pitched to Tucker Carlson are now memorialized in caselaw as being mine. There is no suggestion by the court ‘Discussion’ that Carlson might have created them on his own, or I stole them from the Internet, etc.”
• Validity: Partially valid, but with some stretch.
  • The BACKGROUND (pages 4-8) does provide a detailed, neutral summary of your alleged ideas (e.g., the Epstein-Wexner tip, “Demplosion,” and others), attributing them to you without any counter-suggestions of independent creation or plagiarism on your part. The DISCUSSION doesn’t challenge their originality, focusing instead on contract formation.
  • This “memorialization” is a fair observation—the opinion preserves your narrative in a public court record, which could be useful for future proceedings or public discourse. As we’ve noted, the court’s silence on alternatives (e.g., no hint that Carlson might have sourced them elsewhere) leaves your version unchallenged.
  • Caveat: It’s not “memorialized… as being mine” in a factual sense; it’s a recap of your allegations, assumed true under demurrer (page 11). The opinion doesn’t make affirmative findings on ownership or originality—it doesn’t need to, as the case is about implied contract, not copyright or misappropriation. Calling it “caselaw” implies precedential value, which this unpublished opinion lacks (per Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115). This point is valid as a personal win but overreaches if presented as a legal endorsement.

3. Claim: This Is the First Court to Entertain the Merits of Your Implied-Contract Claim

• Your Essay: “This court of appeals was also the first one to entertain the actual merits of whether or not I had an implied contract. This is the first time since 2020 (five years) that any court has bothered to weigh in on the fricken merits of my allegations!”
• Validity: Valid, with good support from the procedural history.
  • The federal New York case (summarized on pages 2-3) dismissed Carlson on jurisdictional/technical grounds (domicile) without reaching merits, and later dismissed the amended complaint (without Carlson) on preemption and waiver, noting futility even on merits for lack of mutual assent. The California trial court sustained the demurrer on multiple grounds, including merits (failure to state a claim), but the appellate court affirms solely on merits (pages 2, 11-14: “we agree that the complaint fails to state a claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract”), skipping res judicata and statute of limitations.
  • This is indeed the deepest dive into the substance (e.g., applying Desny elements to your facts), making your point accurate. It’s a milestone in getting a full merits analysis, even if unfavorable.
  • Caveat: The federal appellate court (page 3) did touch on merits briefly (“leave to amend… was futile on the merits because Greer failed to allege mutual assent”), so it’s not entirely the first—but this state appellate opinion goes further in detail.

4. Claim: The Court Ignored Grosso Despite Oral Argument, Suggesting It’s a “Hot Potato”

• Your Essay: Quotes the oral argument on Grosso (from Justice Kim and your response), then: “However, the decision used different caselaw and completely ignored the Grosso argument… the court intentionally was silent… It is a hot potato. They do not want to touch. I suspect it is because Grosso was a dangerous decision that weakens the movie studios…”
• Validity: Valid observation on the silence, but the ‘hot potato’ inference is speculative.
  • The opinion doesn’t cite or discuss Grosso v. Fox Corp. (9th Cir. 2004, actually Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp.—minor typo in your essay), despite the oral argument transcript you quote (which aligns with typical appellate questioning). The DISCUSSION relies on state cases (Desny, Spinner, Norman) emphasizing advance bargaining and opportunity to reject, which contrasts with Grosso’s focus on post-disclosure use implying acceptance.
  • Your point that this silence is notable (especially after your rehearing petition) is fair—state courts aren’t bound by federal interpretations of state law, but ignoring a raised case could be appealable error. This strengthens your plan for Supreme Court review.
  • Caveat: “Intentionally ignored” and “hot potato” due to “powerful forces” is a valid personal suspicion but unsubstantiated by the opinion; it could just be the court’s view that Grosso doesn’t control or apply. This adds color to your essay but risks coming across as conspiratorial without evidence.

5. Claim: You Were “Absolutely Legally Correct” to Sue, as Res Judicata and Statute of Limitations Were Not Upheld

• Your Essay: “I was absolutely legally correct to sue Tucker Carlson in California court. The concept of res judicata… was not upheld by the appeals court. There was also no problem with the statute of limitations… However, the concept that a mere idea can be protected was upheld…”
• Validity: Partially valid, but overstated.
  • The appellate court doesn’t address res judicata or SOL (pages 2: “we agree that the complaint fails to state a claim… Therefore, we affirm”), which implicitly means those bars weren’t dispositive—but they remain part of the affirmed trial court ruling (pages 9-10). Your point that they weren’t “upheld” (i.e., not relied upon) is accurate.
  • The “mere idea can be protected” under implied contract is a core California principle (Desny), and the opinion applies it without rejecting the concept outright—valid nod.
  • Caveat: “Absolutely legally correct” ignores the merits dismissal: The court holds no viable claim (page 14: “fails to allege… mutual assent”). This claim stretches by focusing on procedural wins while downplaying the loss.

Overall Assessment and Suggestions

• Strengths: Your essay has valid points on the court’s phrasing, silence, and procedural milestones, making it a compelling personal account. Incorporating the pushback section and my quote shows thoughtful engagement, reducing overreach risks. It’s well-structured for persuasion, especially if aimed at readers sympathetic to your narrative (e.g., for publicity or Supreme Court prep).
• Potential Improvements: To bolster validity, add qualifiers like “while assuming my allegations for demurrer purposes” to acknowledge the standard. Fix minor errors (e.g., “Grossi v. Miramax” should be “Grosso v. Miramax”; “fragrantly” should be “flagrantly”). If this is for a broader audience, cite the full opinion (B343596) for transparency.
• Bottom Line: Yes, you have valid points—your interpretations are grounded in the text’s ambiguities and silences, not fabrications. It’s a fair spin on a tough loss, positioning you for the next step. If you’d like help refining specific sections or researching Grosso parallels for your petition, let me know!

[1] Faris v. Enberg, 97 Cal. App. 3d 309 (Ct. App. 1979).

[2] Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715 (1956).